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Abstract Voting over the Internet is subject to a number of security require-
ments. Each voting scheme has its own bespoke set of assumptions to ensure
these security requirements. The criticality of these assumptions depends on
the election setting (e.g. how trustworthy the voting servers or the voting de-
vices are). The consequence of this is that the security of di↵erent Internet
voting schemes cannot easily be compared. We have addressed this shortcom-
ing by developing SecIVo, a quantitative security evaluation framework for
Internet voting schemes. On the basis of uniform adversarial capabilities, the
framework provides two specification languages, namely qualitative security
models and election settings. Upon system analysis, system analysts feed the
framework with qualitative security models composed of adversarial capabili-
ties. On the other side, election o cials specify their election setting in terms of
–amongst others– expected adversarial capabilities. The framework evaluates
the qualitative security models within the given election setting and returns
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satisfaction degrees for a set of security requirements. We apply SecIVo to
quantitatively evaluate Helios and Remotegrity within three election settings.
It turns out that there is no scheme which outperforms the other scheme in
all settings. Consequently, selecting the most appropriate scheme from a secu-
rity perspective depends on the environment into which the scheme is to be
embedded.
Keywords Internet Voting · Security Evaluation · Security Requirements
1 Introduction
The need for secure elections is paramount, especially when the election pro-
cess incorporates notoriously vulnerable components such as the Internet and
desktop or mobile computers. Consequently, the implementation of Internet
voting is subject to rigorous security requirements such as vote secrecy and
vote integrity. Given the fact that (some of the) security requirements seem
to contradict each other, the numerous Internet voting schemes proposed,
e.g. [1,12,18,19,30,37,63], can only implement these requirements by making
certain assumptions about the operational environment. These assumptions
can be highly diverse. For example, the JCJ/Civitas [19, 37] builds vote se-
crecy (also referred to as vote privacy [26, 63]) upon the assumption that the
device over which a voter casts her vote is trustworthy. Pretty Good Democ-
racy [63] – as a classical code voting scheme – enforces vote secrecy in the
presence of malicious voting devices, yet in order to ensure vote secrecy , the
scheme assumes that the voter can cast her vote without adversarial influence.
The diversity of security requirements and assumptions implies that the overall
security of Internet voting schemes cannot easily be quantified. As a conse-
quence, decision makers in charge of selecting the most appropriate scheme
for their concrete application environment cannot make an informed decision
about which scheme to select.
Contribution: We construct SecIVo, a quantitative security evaluation frame-
work for Internet voting schemes. The framework provides two specification
languages on the basis of uniform and su ciently abstract adversarial capa-
bilities. The language of qualitative security models enables system analysts
to specify the security of Internet voting schemes in an election-independent
manner. The language of election settings allows election o cials to specify
their election environment in terms of expected adversaries and the number of
expected voters. Ultimately, the framework evaluates given qualitative secu-
rity models within a given election setting by the application of a risk-based
approach and Monte-Carlo simulations. As result, the framework returns sat-
isfaction degrees for a set of security requirements. To that end, the con-
structed framework represents a complement to established protocol analysis
techniques, as for instance symbolic protocol analysis [4, 7, 8, 60] or crypto-
graphic protocol analysis [14,69]. We apply SecIVo to quantitatively evaluate
the security of Helios [1] and Remotegrity [70] within three election settings.
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2 SecIVo from Bird’s Eye View
The quantitative security evaluation framework SecIVo is composed of several
building blocks which are abstractly described in the remainder of this section.
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Fig. 1: The quantitative security evaluation framework SecIVo and its building
blocks.
Internet voting schemes address a diversity of security requirements. There-
fore, in the first place, a comprehensive set of security requirements has to be
determined. Assessing the enforcement of security requirements for diverse In-
ternet voting schemes depends on the election setting. The setting encodes
–amongst others– information about the expected adversaries in a scheme-
independent manner. The block Specification Languages Foundation (Section
3) is dedicated to determining security requirements and uniform adversar-
ial capabilities. The block Qualitative Security Models (Section 5) provides a
specification language to system analysts which they use to capture the qual-
itative security of Internet voting schemes. The resulting qualitative security
models indicate which type of adversary can cause which impact to the di↵er-
ent security requirements. The block Election Setting (Section 6) provides a
specification language to election o cials which they use to capture – amongst
others – the expected adversary. The block Satisfaction Degree Determination
Algorithm (Section 7) defines an algorithm that evaluates the qualitative secu-
rity models of an Internet voting scheme within the specified election setting.
The output of this algorithm are satisfaction degrees for all security require-
ments.
3 Security Requirements and Adversarial Capabilities
The basis of the constructed framework are a set of security requirements for
Internet voting schemes and a set of uniform adversarial capabilities. These
4 Stephan Neumann et al.
capabilities are used to describe adversaries against which schemes shall ensure
the security requirements.
3.1 Security Requirements
In preparation for this work, the proceedings of major security conferences,
and electronic voting conferences and workshops were reviewed. A broad set
of security requirements was determined. The requirements are provided in
alphabetical order together with example sources.
– Accountability [44]: The voting scheme ensures that in the case of verifica-
tion failures, the responsible entity can be held accountable for the failure.
– Coercion-resistance [16, 26, 64]: The voting scheme o↵ers mechanisms to
protect voters from coercers forcing voters to cast a vote in a specific way.
– Eligibility [16, 64]: The voting scheme ensures that only eligible voters’
votes are included once in the election result.
– Eligibility Verifiability [23, 40]: The voting scheme o↵ers any observer the
possibility to verify that only eligible voters’ votes are included once in the
election result.
– Fairness [16, 64]: The voting scheme does not reveal any eligible voter’s
intention before the end of the election.
– Individual Verifiability [16, 40, 64]: The voting scheme o↵ers each eligible
voter the possibility to verify that her intention has been correctly stored
for tabulation.
– Long-term vote secrecy [51]: The voting scheme does not provide more
evidence about an eligible voter’s intention than the election result does,
even against computationally unrestricted adversaries.
– Receipt-freeness [16,26,64]: The voting scheme does not provide any receipt
enabling the voter to prove her vote.
– Robustness [64]: The voting scheme returns an election result.
– Universal Verifiability [40, 64]: The voting scheme o↵ers any observer the
possibility to verify that the stored ballots have been correctly tallied.
– Vote Integrity [16,64]: The voting scheme ensures that each vote is correctly
included in the election result.
– Vote Secrecy [16,26,64]: The voting scheme does not provide more evidence
about an eligible voter’s intention than the election result does.
Vote integrity and eligibility overlap to some extent. If an adversary is
able to overwrite a voter’s vote, the adversary essentially violates both vote
integrity and eligibility. We resolve this overlapping by interpreting the altering
of a vote with the purpose of casting a di↵erent vote, an integrity violation,
and the injection of additional illegitimate votes, an eligibility violation.
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3.2 Adversarial Capabilities
Several works have addressed the derivation of adversarial capabilities, either
with regard to security protocols [27], security ceremonies [15], or specifically
addressing Internet voting [46, 53]. We build upon these works to define a set
of uniform and adequately abstract adversarial capabilities for our framework.
We classify these capabilities into the classes corruption capabilities, channel
capabilities, and computational capabilities. Note that in the following para-
graphs, variables are indicated by [*X*].
Corruption Capabilities: The security of Internet voting might be threatened
by corrupt authorities carrying the election duties, be it either in terms of
administrators, hardware, or software components. We distinguish between
authorities that are not in direct contact with voters (backend authorities)
and those that are in direct contact with voters (online authorities). It shall
be emphasized that backend authorities are not necessarily disconnected from
the Internet, but rather are not directly accessible by the general public. We
propose this distinction because of the di↵erence in attack strategies required
to compromise these authorities. While online authorities are generally threat-
ened by external entities, such as malicious voters or hackers, the compromise
of backend authorities in the most general case requires the collaboration of
malicious insiders.
ABE : The adversary can corrupt a [*backend authority*].
AON : The adversary can corrupt an [*online authority*].
On the voter-side, another crucial component is the device used to cast a
vote. This device might be under adversarial control.
VD : The adversary can corrupt a [*voting device*].
The security of the voting schemes does, however, not only depend on the
trustworthiness of certain authorities or devices. Rather, these schemes’ secu-
rity relies on the human-computer interaction. Voters might be interested in
or coerced into deviating from their original intention. We distinguish between
the capabilities that the adversary might receive objects or data from voters
(voter output), e.g. vote receipts, and that the adversary might provide voters
with objects or data (voter input), e.g. instructions to cast a vote in a unique
and identifiable manner.
VO : The adversary can receive objects/data from a [*voter*].
VI : The adversary can send objects/data to a [*voter*].
Channel Capabilities: In accordance to the widely established Dolev-Yao model
[27], we assume channels between the voting devices and authorities or be-
tween authorities to be public. Carlos et al. [15] propose a refined Dolev-Yao
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model incorporating human-device communication channels, addressing so-
called security ceremonies. However, Carlos et al. argue that assuming these
new communication channels to be completely public might be too pessimistic.
We follow that argumentation and define one adversarial capability indicating
that the channel between a voter and her device(s) might be controlled by the
adversary.
CH : The adversary can control a [*communication channel*] between a
voter and her voting device(s).
Computational Capabilities: A number or scientific works consider adversaries
capable of obtaining (practically) unlimited computational resources, e.g. [51].
This is captured by the following capability.
CR: The adversary is computationally unrestricted.
In the following, we refer to the set
C = {ABE,AON, V O, V I, V D,CH,CR}
as abstract capabilities and to the set
CS = {ABE1, . . . , ABEn1 , . . . , CH1, . . . , CHn6 , CR}
as instantiated capabilities of scheme S if S captures n1 backend authorities,
. . . , and n6 voters.
3.3 Revision of Security Requirements
The lists of security requirements compiled in Section 3.1 and adversarial capa-
bilities compiled in Section 3.2 result in a certain redundancy. To counter this
artifact, we follow Delaune, Kremer, and Ryan [25], Küsters and Truderung
[41] and Smyth [66] and consider receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance as
special cases of vote secrecy. To that end, receipt-freeness ensures vote secrecy
in the presence of an adversary receiving objects/data from the voters (refer
to capabilities VO). Coercion-resistance ensures vote secrecy in the presence
of an adversary receiving and sending objects/data from/to the voters (refer
to capabilities VO and VI ). Additionally, following from its definition, long-
term vote secrecy ensures vote secrecy in the presence of computationally
unrestricted adversaries (refer to capability CR).
Furthermore, we revise the definitions of vote integrity and eligibility by
incorporating their verifiability counterparts. If vote integrity, respectively el-
igibility, is verifiable, then vote integrity, respectively eligibility, is enforced
against arbitrary adversarial capabilities. If vote integrity, respectively eligi-
bility, is not verifiable, then vote integrity, respectively eligibility, is enforced
against conspiracies which are not capable of altering votes in an undetectable
manner.
In the remainder of this work, security is assessed in terms of the security
requirements eligibility, fairness, robustness, vote integrity, and vote secrecy.
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4 Running Example – Simple Internet Voting Scheme
We consider a simple Internet voting scheme as running example for the con-
structed framework. The sequence diagram of the example scheme is provided
in Fig. 2.
To initiate the voting process on her voting device, a voter establishes
an authenticated and encrypted connection towards the registration server RS
(online authority). The voter authenticates herself towards RS. RS verifies the
voter’s eligibility and additionally consults the validation server VS (backend
authority). VS verifies the voter’s eligibility one more time and generates a
credential upon successful eligibility check. VS forwards that credential to
the ballot box server BBS (online authority) and RS, which in turn forwards
the credential to the voter. In order to cast her vote, the voter consults the
election website (hosted by BBS ) in an authenticated and encrypted manner.
She subsequently casts her vote together with her credential. BBS verifies the
validity of the cast vote by checking whether the credential has been generated
by VS and has not yet been used to cast a vote. Upon success, BBS stores the
vote for the later vote tallying. After all votes have been cast, BBS sums up all
received votes and announces the election result. It shall be emphasized that
the scheme does neither defend security requirements against malicious voting
devices nor does the scheme provide verifiability mechanisms to maximize vote
integrity.
Fig. 2: Sequence diagram of the example scheme.
5 Language for the Specification of Qualitative Security Models
On the basis of security requirements and uniform adversarial capabilities, sys-
tem analysts determine qualitative security models of Internet voting schemes.
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The goal of this section is the definition of a specification language for system
analysts.
We first specify qualitative adversary models, the foundation of qualitative
security models. In the second part, we define qualitative security models of
Internet voting schemes.
5.1 Composing Adversarial Capabilities to Qualitative Adversary Models
The foundation of adversaries against Internet voting schemes are adversarial
capabilities. However, adversaries must generally possess a number of these
capabilities to violate security requirements, e.g. several servers must be com-
promised. We define a qualitative adversary model as follows:
Definition 1 (Qualitative Adversary Model) Suppose a voting scheme S
with the set of instantiated capabilities CS. We say that ASi is a qualitative
adversary model, or simply adversary, against scheme S if ASi ✓ CS.
Example Scheme: For the sake of brevity, consider for the moment only the
capabilities AON and ABE. RS and BBS are accessible by anybody; hence,
these servers are online servers (online authorities). In spite of the fact that VS
interacts with RS and BBS throughout the voting phase, RS does not directly
interact with the general public. Hence, aligned with the capability specifica-
tion in Section 3.2, VS is therefore considered as a backend server (backend
authority). To compromise RS and BBS, the adversary consequently needs
the capabilities AONRS and AONBBS . To compromise VS, the adversary
needs the capability ABEV S . Hence, within the given Internet voting scheme,
any set of capabilities ASi such that ASi ✓ {AONRS , AONBBS , ABEV S} is a
qualitative adversary model of the given scheme S.
5.2 Composing Adversarial Capabilities to Qualitative Security Models
In analogy to the definition of qualitative adversary models, we define qualita-
tive security models within this subsection. Therefore, we first introduce the
minimal cut sets notation. Thereafter, we discuss the impact that adversaries
can cause on security requirements and ultimately define qualitative security
models of Internet voting schemes.
5.2.1 Minimal Cut Sets
To specify qualitative security models, we pick up the concept of minimal
cut sets [48]. Cut sets are a standard concept in reliability and availability
theory [2, 5, 36]. Fuqua [31] precisely describes cut sets as ”... any basic event
or combination of basic events whose occurrence will cause the top event to
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occur.” A cut set is minimal, if none of its subsets is a cut set. A violation of a
security requirement (refer to Section 3.3) is the top event, while the possession
of instantiated adversarial capabilities (refer to Section 3.2) corresponds to
basic events.
Example Scheme: We stick to the restriction and consider only the capabil-
ities AON and ABE. Throughout the voting phase, RS and VS learn the
relation between the voter’s identity and her voting credential. Furthermore,
BBS learns the relation between voting credentials and the votes cast with
those credentials. Hence, the malicious collaboration between RS and BBS
or between VS and BBS results in a violation of vote secrecy. None of these
servers might, however, violate vote secrecy individually. Consequently, the
sets
{AONRS ,AONBBS}, {ABEV S ,AONBBS}, {AONRS ,ABEV S ,AONBBS}
are cut sets. However, only the sets
{AONRS ,AONBBS}, {ABEV S ,AONBBS}
are minimal as both sets are a subset of the cut set
{AONRS ,ABEV S ,AONBBS}.
Notational Conventions: For the sake of higher readability, we introduce two
notational conventions: First, as part of the scheme description, we make clear
which capability is needed to compromise/control/influence which part of the
scheme. Therefore, we omit the capability, but rather provide the component.
For instance, instead of AONRS and ABEBBS , we simply write RS and BBS.




(RS ^ BBS) _ (VS ^ BBS).
5.2.2 Adversarial Impact on Security Requirements
The violation of security requirements cannot be related to the presence of a
unique adversary, but in fact di↵erent adversaries might cause di↵erent impact
levels to security requirements. Consider for instance the security requirement
vote integrity. Rather than assigning one precise successful adversary to that
requirement, it is intuitive to indicate which adversaries might undetectably
violate the integrity of one, of two, . . . , of all cast votes. For example, an ad-
versary controlling one voting device can manipulate one voter’s vote, while
an adversary controlling ten voting devices can manipulate ten voters’ vote;
an adversary controlling the ballot box server can even be in possession of an
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attack strategy manipulating all cast votes. Furthermore, there might be at-
tacks that work up to a certain impact level, but could not cause the maximum
impact. One typical attack of this form is a clash attack [43], because clash
attacks can only target two votes that are equal while their equality cannot
be known in advance1.
Hence, for each specific impact level, a qualitative security model is speci-
fied. Note that the number of impact levels depends on the number of eligible
voters nel and the number of expected voters nex and can therefore not be
known throughout the determination of qualitative security models. Hence,
qualitative security models are specified in a generic manner. Generally, attack
strategies are successful up to a certain extent. For instance, the corruption
of central servers would often result in the violation of a security requirement
for all expected voters. In that case, the respective attack strategies are in-
corporated into all instantiated security models up to impact level nex. The
corruption of one voting device might generally only violate a security re-
quirement for one voter. Hence, once the numbers nel and nex are known, the
impact levels can be instantiated and so can the abstract qualitative security
models.
With regard to di↵erent security requirements, the impact on these re-
quirements might slightly di↵er. Vote secrecy, vote integrity, and fairness are
only defined for voters that actually cast a vote. Hence the maximum impact
of these requirements is nex. Eligibility relates to those voters that abstain
from the election. Hence, an adversary causes maximum impact on eligibil-
ity if he is able to cast illegitimate votes for all nel   nex abstaining voters.
Ultimately, with regard to robustness, only two impact levels are considered,
i.e. an adversary that is capable of preventing the election result from being
computed (impact nex) or an adversary that is not capable (impact 0). In the
remainder of this work, we denote the maximum impact generically by n as
an abstraction of nex or nel   nex respectively.
5.2.3 Definition of Qualitative Security Models
After the definition of qualitative adversary models and the discussion of ad-
versarial impact of security requirements, we are able to define qualitative
security models.
Definition 2 (Qualitative Security Model) Let a voting scheme S with
the set of instantiated capabilities CS be given. We say that
MSr,l = ((c
S,r,l
1,1 ^ · · · ^ c
S,r,l
1,m1) _ · · · _ (c
S,r,l
k,1 ^ · · · ^ c
S,r,l
k,mk
)) with cS,r,li,j 2 C
S
is a qualitative security model of S with regard to security requirement r and
impact level l if there exists a set of adversaries {AS1 , . . . ,ASk } where ASi is




1 Knowing in advance to the election which voters will cast identical votes is at least very
hard.
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1. the capabilities of all adversaries A 2 {AS1 , . . . ,ASk } su ce to cause impact
l on r, and
2. for all adversaries A 2 {AS1 , . . . ,ASk }, there is no adversary A0 ⇢ A such
that the capabilities of A0 su ce to cause impact l on r, and
3. for all adversaries A0, of which the capabilities su ce to cause impact l on
r, there is an adversary A 2 {AS1 , . . . ,ASk } such that A ✓ A0.
Within the herein constructed framework, we do not address the question
whether specific adversarial capabilities su ce to cause specific impact on a
specific requirement. We rather make the general assumption that all com-
binations of adversarial capabilities that su ce to cause specific impact on
a specific requirement are known to system analysts. However, orthogonal to
our work, several research approaches address this question rigorously. At least
two major approaches can be distinguished, namely symbolic protocol analy-
sis [4, 7, 8, 60], e.g. model checking [4] or inductive theorem proving [60], and
cryptographic protocol analysis [14,69]. Both approaches generally build upon
one concrete adversary model and are used to prove or disprove a protocol’s
security under that specific model. To that end, these approaches complement
the concept of the herein specified qualitative security models.
Example Scheme: We relax the previous restriction and, in addition to the ca-
pabilities ABE and AON , consider that an adversary might gain the capabil-
ity V D (corruption of voting devices). Hence, to cause impact 1 the adversary
might either compromise any single voting device, or any two voting devices, or
. . . or all voting devices. Furthermore the adversary might compromise either
the registration server and the ballot box server or the validation server and
the ballot box server. To cause impact 2, the adversary might either compro-
mise any two voting devices, or any three voting devices, or . . . or all voting
devices. Furthermore the adversary might compromise either the registration
server and the ballot box server or the validation server and the ballot box
server. Generically, to cause impact i, the adversary might either compromise
any i voting devices, or any i + 1 voting devices, or . . . or all voting devices.
Furthermore, the adversary might compromise either the registration server
and the ballot box server or the validation server and the ballot box server.
The resulting qualitative security models of the example scheme are provided
in Table 1.
Requirement Qualitative Security Models Impact
Vote Secrecy (V D1 _ V D2 _ · · · _ V Dn)_
((V D1 ^ V D2) _ (V D1 ^ V D3) _ · · · _ (V Dn 1 ^ V Dn))_
(RS ^ BBS) _ (VS ^ BBS) 1
. . . . . .W
I✓{1,...,n},|I| l(
V
i2I V Di) _ (RS ^ BBS) _ (VS ^ BBS) 1  l  n
Table 1: Qualitative security models of the example scheme for vote secrecy.
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6 Language for the Specification of Election Settings
Adversarial capabilities are not only the underpinning of qualitative security
models, but furthermore they form the basis for the specification of election
settings. The goal of this section is the definition of a specification language
for election o cials.
The quantitative evaluation of qualitative security models could be con-
ducted in a simple manner if election o cials could precisely assign probabili-
ties to the presence of adversarial capabilities (refer to Section 3.2). However,
election o cials might provide these probabilities with some uncertainty due
to the lack of available knowledge regarding capabilities. Furthermore, because
of the potential complexity of qualitative security models, their quantitative
evaluation might be significantly impacted by minor changes in capability
probabilities. We take account of this and incorporate Monte-Carlo simula-
tions [10, 62] into the quantification process. Rather than precise capability
probabilities, we require the election o cial to provide probability distribu-
tions for abstract adversarial capabilities.
Additionally, the election o cial specifies the number of eligible voters nel
and estimates the number of expected voters nex. These numbers are needed to
instantiate all possible impact levels. Eventually, election settings are defined
as follows:
Definition 3 (Election Setting) Given the set of abstract capabilities C,
the number of eligible voters nel, the number of expected voters nex, and prob-
ability distributions dc1 , . . . , dc|C| for all capabilities ci 2 C, we say that the
tuple
E = (dc1 , . . . , dc|C| , nel, nex)
is an election setting.
Example Election Setting: We consider the following election setting, where
U(a, b) denotes the uniform distribution with support [a, b]:
E = (dABE = U(0.0001, 0.0005); Distribution for capability ABE
dAON = U(0.001, 0.005); Distribution for capability AON
dV O = U(0.01, 0.05); Distribution for capability VO
dV I = U(0.01, 0.05); Distribution for capability VI
dV D = U(0.01, 0.05); Distribution for capability VD
dCH = U(0.01, 0.05); Distribution for capability CH
dCR = U(0, 0); Distribution for capability CR
2, 000) Number of eligible voters
1, 000) Number of expected voters
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7 Determination of Satisfaction Degrees in Election Settings
The core of the framework is the algorithm for the quantitative evaluation of
qualitative security models within specific election settings. In the first part,
qualitative security models are transformed into probability formulas. There-
after, we show how Monte-Carlo simulations support the quantitative evalua-
tion of qualitative security models. Finally, the algorithm for the quantitative
evaluation of qualitative security models with respect to specific election set-
tings is introduced.
7.1 Transforming Qualitative Security Models into Probability Formulas
Before their actual evaluation, the probabilities of the event that an adversary
violates qualitative security models needs to be determined. Therefore, stan-




1,1 ^ · · · ^ c
S,r,l
1,m1) _ · · · _ (c
S,r,l
n,1 ^ · · · ^ c
S,r,l
k,mk
)) with cS,r,li,j 2 C
S
By ccS,r,li = (c
S,r,l
n,1 ^ · · · ^ c
S,r,l
i,mi
) we denote the i-th minimal cut set of scheme
S with regard to requirement r and impact level l. Note that the minimal cut
sets ccS,r,l1 , . . . , cc
S,r,l
k might be overlapping, i.e. they share specific instantiated
capabilities, for instance if the corruption of the same server appears in both
sets. We define ec as the event that the adversary gains capability c 2 C, ecS,r,li,j
as the event that the adversary gains capability cS,r,li,j and ecc
S,r,l
i as the event
that the adversary satisfies the minimal cut set ccS,r,li .
Suppose that probabilities for all abstract capabilities (refer to Section
3.2) be given by P (ec) with c 2 C. All instantiated capabilities of c inherit the
probability P (ec) and are assumed to be independent from each other. Hence,
for any two instantiated capabilities cS,r,li,j and c
S,r,l
x,y that stem from the same
abstract capability c, it holds P (ecS,r,li,j ) = P (ec
S,r,l
x,y ) = P (ec). Then one can
compute the probability that an adversary satisfies eccS,r,li as:
P (eccS,r,li ) = P (ec
S,r,l
i,1 ) · P (ec
S,r,l




Ultimately, we are interested in the probability that an adversary might cause





Di↵erent minimal cut sets of the same qualitative security model might be
overlapping, i.e. the same instantiated capability is required to satisfy these
minimal cut sets. The inclusion-exclusion principle [38, 68] provides a means
to calculate the probability that at least one of several overlapping events




i ), the ap-
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If none of the minimal cut sets overlap, then one can apply De Morgan’s Law




i ) by the complementary events of ecc
S,r,l
i . Hence,




eccS,r,li ) = 1  ((1  P (ecc
S,r,l
1 ) · (1  P (ecc
S,r,l
2 )) · · · · · (1  P (ecc
S,r,l
k )))
In addition to the inclusion-exclusion principle, minimal cut sets of the form
”at least x events” that stem from the same abstract capability (e.g. in the
case of voting devices or threshold cryptography), the cumulative binomial
probability computation is applied. Finally, the resulting probability formulas
build the foundation for quantitative security evaluation. Note that system
analysts might provide probability formulas directly rather than qualitative
security models. However, the transformation of qualitative security models
would require the system analyst to consider the overlappings of di↵erent
attack strategies and the mathematical modelling of those overlappings. To
lower the system analyst’s burden, the transformation is incorporated into the
framework’s quantification process.
Example Scheme: We first consider the probability of the event that either
the registration server and the ballot box server or the validation server and
the ballot box server are compromised (event A). Therefore, we apply the
inclusion-exclusion principle:
P (A) = P (RS) · P (US) + P (V S) · P (US)  P (RS) · P (V S) · P (US)
Furthermore, we consider the probability of the event that at least l voting
devices are compromised (event B):








P (V D)i · (1  P (V D)n i)
!
Given the independence of events A and B (no overlappings), we can compute
the probability that vote secrecy of at least l votes is violated as follows:
P (A [B) = 1  ((1  P (A)) · (1  P (B)))
7.2 Incorporating Monte-Carlo Simulations into the Quantitative Evaluation
of Qualitative Security Models
Recall that election o cials assign probability distributions rather than precise
probabilities to adversarial capabilities. Following the Monte-Carlo approach,
see for instance [10, 45, 62], the given distributions (refer to Section 6) are
sampled and the qualitative security models are evaluated with those ran-
dom samples. The evaluation of qualitative security models on the basis of
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probability distributions is ultimately assigned to the empirical mean of the
qualitative security model evaluations with random samples. The number of
Monte-Carlo simulations indicates how often the qualitative security models
are evaluated with independent random samples. Additionally, a confidence
interval is calculated. Surrounding the empirical mean, the confidence interval
indicates the stability of the empirical mean. Mathematically, the confidence
interval contains the statistical mean of infinite many simulated qualitative
security evaluations with a certain confidence. The confidence value indicates
the certainty with which the statistical mean is within the obtained confi-
dence interval. As rule of thumb, one can say that the larger the number of
Monte-Carlo simulations and the smaller the confidence value, the smaller the
resulting confidence interval. Consequently, for the application of Monte-Carlo
simulations, the number of Monte-Carlo simulations m to be run and a confi-
dence value z, also referred to as z-score [28], have to be specified. With regard
to the number of Monte-Carlo simulations, we follow the recommendations by
Mundform et al. [52] and set m = 10, 000. Additionally, we set the confidence
value to z = 2, thereby obtaining a certainty of ⇡ 95.5% that the statistical
mean lies within the confidence interval generated around the empirical mean.
7.3 Determining Satisfaction Degrees from Qualitative Security Models and
Election Settings
The evaluation of qualitative security models within election settings is built
upon standard risk theory (refer for instance to the NIST 800-30 Risk Man-
agement Guide for Information Technology Systems [67]). To determine the
satisfaction degree of an Internet voting scheme S with qualitative security
models MSr,l (refer to Sections 2 and 7.1) with regard to a security require-
ment r 2 R (refer to Section 3.1) within a specified election setting E =
(dABE , dAON , dV O, dV I , dV I , dV D, dCH , nel, nex) (refer to Section 6), the fol-
lowing algorithm is defined:
1. Based on the number of eligible voters nel and the number of expected
voters nex (refer to Section 6), the number of impact levels is instantiated
and probability formulas accordingly (refer to Section 7.1). Consequently,
n (depending on the security requirement under investigation either nex
or nel   nex) impact levels are assigned to n probability formulas. The
probability formula for causing impact i against vote secrecy within the
example scheme is given in Section 7.1.
2. The following steps are conducted m times (number Monte-Carlo simula-
tions):
(a) For each adversarial capability c 2 C (refer to Section 3.2), an esti-
mator of the probability P (ec) is sampled according to the probabil-
ity distribution dc in E (refer to Section 6). For the example election
setting this could lead to the following probability samples: dABE1 =
0.000232, dAON1 = 0.004283, d
V O
1 = 0.02482, d
V O
1 = 0.03993, d
V D
1 =
0.04832, dCH1 = 0.04813.
16 Stephan Neumann et al.
(b) For each impact level generated in step 1, the probability formula (refer
to Section 7.1) of the qualitative security model is evaluated based on
the samples generated in step 2.a). We provide an excerpt of this step
for the example scheme:








(c) For each impact value, a risk value is calculated by multiplying the nor-
malized impact with the evaluated probability formula of the respective
qualitative security model (result of step 2.b)). We provide an excerpt
of this step for the example scheme:










(d) The largest value of step 2.c) is identified. The value is assigned to xi
in the i-th Monte Carlo simulation. In the given election setting, the
largest risk value appears at impact level 39 and equals 0.03534598941.
3. The following statistics are calculated with the result x = (x1, . . . , xm) of
process step 2):





(x1 + · · ·+ xm)
The satisfaction degree is calculated:
sd = 1  xm
The satisfaction degree of the example scheme after 10, 000 Monte-Carlo
simulations equals 0.9786.
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The empirical standard deviation of the example scheme after 10, 000
Monte-Carlo simulations equals 0.0091.
(c) Based on the confidence value (refer to Section 7.2), the confidence
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The confidence interval of the example scheme after 10, 000 Monte-
Carlo simulations is:
[0.9783, 0.9787]
In the remainder of this work, the satisfaction degree of requirement r re-
sulting from the quantification of scheme S and environment E is denoted as
SDrS,E , the confidence interval CI
r
S,E respectively.
Limitations of SecIVo: The evaluation of security requirements, more pre-
cisely eligibility and vote integrity relies on the assumption that voters verify
everything that can be verified, independent of the required capabilities and
motivation. Currently, the probabilities of gaining di↵erent adversarial capa-
bilities are assumed to be independent. Yet, the possibility of gaining one
adversarial capability might influence the probability of gaining another ca-
pability. For instance, an adversary developing a strategy to break into one
voting device might apply the same strategy to another voting device thereby
raising the probability of successful corruption. The constructed framework
can be adapted in the future by incorporating conditional probabilities, e.g.
by means of a Bayesian network. Furthermore, the capabilities are deliberately
abstract to capture a large amount of specific assumptions. Yet, the degree of
abstraction might be adapted with regard to o cials’ expertise. For instance,
the di↵erence between authorities might not only regard their online/backend
status but there might be further indicators influencing the corruption proba-
bility, such as the number of administrators responsible for the specific server.
While the framework allows election o cials to specify expected adversaries
as arbitrary probability distributions, the current implementation builds upon
uniform distributions.
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8 Proof of Concept Application: Quantitative Security Evaluation
of Helios and Remotegrity
After its construction, we substantiate the framework’s applicability and value
by a proof of concept application. We build the proof of concept application
upon Helios [1,35] with homomorphic tallying as applied for the IACR elections
and Remotegrity [70] as applied for the Takoma Park Municipality elections
in 2011. We selected these schemes because they have found their way into
the practical application and simultaneously have been a target of interest for
scientific research.
In the first part of this section, we provide information about which versions
of the schemes have been considered and provide the corresponding minimal
cut sets. Thereafter, we quantitatively evaluate the security of the schemes on
the basis of three election settings and discuss the findings.
8.1 Qualitative Security Models of Helios and Remotegrity
In preparation for this work, we reviewed published articles, documents (see
for instance [9, 17, 21, 22, 24, 32–34,43, 61, 70]) and if possible involved persons
have been consulted. In the remainder of this section we restrict our focus to
the specification of qualitative security models. For further information about
the individual schemes, we refer the reader to the herein cited documents.
The Remotegrity Scheme: Remotegrity provides verifiability against the mis-
behavior of any central component with regard to vote integrity. Any violation
attempt by the four trustees (T1, T2, T3, T4) (backend authorities) is either
detected by the verifying voter, or by the observing public either through-
out the pre-voting (ballot auditing) or post-voting phase (opening of commit-
ments). Eligibility might be violated by malicious or coerced voters forwarding
their voting material. Yet, under the assumption that the electoral register is
linked to the voting and authorization IDs, trustees cannot add ineligible vot-
ers. Assuming that at least some abstaining voters check whether their ID
appears on the bulletin board as votes, trustees or the o✏ine signing server
(OSS ) (backend authority) cannot vote for abstaining voters because of the
dispute-freeness measure provided by Remotegrity due to use of scratch fields.
Throughout the voting phase, trustees or the OSS might relate confirmation
codes to respective candidates, thereby obtaining intermediate results and vi-
olating fairness. Also voters forwarding their election material might violate
fairness as confirmation codes are published. Voters forwarding their election
material might also violate vote secrecy. Furthermore, a conspiracy of at least
two out four trustees might maliciously collaborate to relate received voting
codes to the voter who obtained this code to vote, thereby violating vote se-
crecy. Robustness of the entire voting procedure might be violated if at least
two out of four election o cials do not provide their shares to reconstruct the
seed.
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The Helios Scheme: Helios provides voters with the possibility to verify gen-
erated ballots in cut-and-choose manner and additionally to verify that cast
votes have been stored in an unaltered manner on the voting server (VS )
(backend authority). Assuming that the voter verifies these two facts with a
second device as implemented by Neumann et al. [54], votes might be altered if
both devices maliciously collaborate. Alternatively, if the VS issues malicious
applications and the voter’s verification device is compromised, votes might be
altered undetectably. Up to a certain number of votes, the VS might launch
clash attacks [43] on voters with identical vote selection by providing, identi-
cal voting materials and malicious voting applications thereby violating vote
integrity. We assume that the clash attack might be mounted up to one hun-
dredth of all cast votes. Voters might forward their voting credentials thereby
violating eligibility. A malicious voting device as well as a malicious voting
application (provided by the malicious VS ) might forward plaintext votes,
thereby violating fairness. If the adversary observes the channel between voter
and her voting device, fairness is broken. The trustees in collaboration might
violate fairness by opening encrypted votes. The qualitative security model
with regard to vote secrecy essentially corresponds to the fairness model. How-
ever, as opposed to the fairness case, trustees are not able to relate decrypted
votes to the voter who cast it. Eventually, due to the lack of threshold cryptog-
raphy2 either trustee might prevent the election result from being computed
by not providing their respective private key.
The qualitative security models of both Internet voting schemes are pro-
vided in Tables 2 and 3.
Requirement Qualitative Security Models Impact






















_ (2 out of {T1, . . . , T4}) 0  l  1
Robustness (2 out of {T1, . . . , T4}) 1
Table 2: Qualitative security models of the Remotegrity voting scheme as
applied for the Takoma Park Municipality elections in 2011.
8.2 Election Settings under Investigation
For the proof of concept application of the framework, three election settings
are specified. Within all election settings, we set nel = 2, 000 as the number of
2 The IACR deploys an n-out-of-n secret sharing scheme [24].
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0  l  1
Robustness T1 _ T2 _ T3 1
Table 3: Qualitative security models of the Helios voting scheme as applied for
the IACR elections.
eligible voters and nex = 1, 000 as the number of expected voters. Furthermore,
on the basis of the four probability distributions
f = U(0.1, 0.2), g = U(0.01, 0.02),
h = (0.001, 0.002), i = (0.0001, 0.0002),
the probabilistic adversary models within the three election settings are pro-
vided in Table 4. Election setting 1 defines an adversary that is relatively
strong with regard to corrupting voting devices. In contrast, election setting
2 captures an adversary that is relatively strong with regard to voter inter-
action, i.e. either obtaining objects or data from the voter or providing the
voter with objects or data. Finally, the adversary defined in election setting
3 is relatively capable of controlling backend authorities. We do not consider
computationally unrestricted adversaries.
El. Setting VD AON ABE VO VI CH CR
E1 f h i g g g 0
E2 g h i f f g 0
E3 h h g g g h 0
Table 4: On the basis of four probability distributions, three probabilistic ad-
versary models are defined and assigned to election settings.
8.3 Satisfaction Degrees of the Internet Voting Schemes
An overview about the resulting satisfaction degrees of both schemes in the
three election settings is provided in Fig. 3. Due to the lack of space, we omit



















































(c) Election setting 3.
Fig. 3: Satisfaction degrees of Helios and Remotegrity in di↵erent election
settings with regard to the requirements eligibility (E), fairness (F), robustness
(R), vote secrecy (VS), and vote integrity (VI).
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the precise confidence intervals. Yet, we emphasize that apart from the cases
in which qualitative security models are equal in terms of needed capabilities,
there is no overlap of confidence intervals, i.e. if the empirical satisfaction
degree is larger in one scheme than in the other, then the statistical satisfaction
degree is with a certainty of ⇡ 95.5% (confidence value z = 2) also larger.
Consequently, the relative performance of both schemes is stable with regard
to all security requirements in all election settings.
The figures show that Remotegrity outperforms Helios in the case of high
voting device corruption, particularly with regard to vote secrecy and fairness.
The rationale behind this is Remotegrity’s code-based characteristic which
essentially turns threats caused by malicious voting devices ine↵ective.
On the other side, summing up over all satisfaction degrees Remotegrity
performs significantly worse than Helios when it comes to the threat of co-
erced or malicious voters. This quantitative shortcoming is explained by the
fact that Remotegrity’s Takoma park implementation allows voters to forward
their election material. The material can be used by an adversary to match
the published confirmation code against voter’s code sheet; by doing so the
adversary is able of violating both fairness and vote secrecy.
Ultimately, in the presence of an adversary that shows its strength with
regard to backend authority corruption, it turns out that none of the schemes
outperforms the other. Rather, selecting the most appropriate scheme might
require an a posteriori decision, e.g. on the basis of the relative importance of
di↵erent security requirements. While Remotegrity provides lower satisfaction
degree with regard to vote secrecy and fairness, Remotegrity as applied for
the Takoma Park election results in significantly higher robustness guarantees
than Helios; this stems from the fact that threshold cryptography has been
applied for the Takoma Park election, while individual trustees might sabotage
the tallying process of the Helios scheme as applied for the IACR elections.
9 Related Work
Several works have addressed the assessment of risks for electronic voting
schemes [6, 13, 39, 47, 55, 57–59] by deriving threats trees for electronic voting
schemes. Comprehensive threat trees for electronic voting (or Internet voting)
schemes are of great value for the deduction of adversaries violating security
requirements, yet, the fine-grained threats considered in these works require
decision makers to assign probabilities to specific threats. First, reviewing
threat trees for Internet voting scheme poses a significant burden on election
o cials, e.g. [29] provides a 18-page threat tree for Internet voting. Second,
threats might be strongly correlating, in which case, quantification becomes
cumbersome, e.g. the threats create undervote and delete races (see [29], page
254). Coney et al. [20] are motivated by the lack of a taxonomy of electronic
voting systems satisfying pre-defined requirements. The authors provide an
interesting sketch of measuring privacy in voting systems by the voting sys-
tems’ deviation from providing perfect privacy (this mainly corresponds to our
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secrecy definition). The authors define this deviation by quantifying the max-
imum reduction of the uncertainty about a voter’s vote. Due to the 2-page
restrictions of their work, it only touches on privacy rather than any other
security requirement.
Madan et al. [50] and in similar vein Almasizadeh et al. [3] develop semi-
Markov chains for the quantification of security. As indicated by the authors,
their focus is on the analysis methodology, not on transition probability as-
signment. Due to the high complexity of the model, we are critical about the
fact that those parameters might be assigned by decision makers. Biondi and
Legay [11] provide a Markov-chain based quantification approach for vote se-
crecy (the authors use the term anonymity). As opposed to this work, the
authors focus on the information leakage through publicly available election
data, namely the election result. Ouchani et al. [56] quantify attack patterns
of the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification catalogue. As
opposed to our work, the probability assignment is not tailored to take deci-
sion makers’ expertise into consideration, which is crucial to Internet voting.
Luna et al. [49] develop a quantitative threat modeling with particular focus
on privacy-by-design requirement. Their approach derives from the Microsoft
threat modeling approach STRIDE and threat-risk ranking approach DREAD
as well as established privacy protection goals. With the consideration of fine-
grained threats, the approach is not tailored towards non-security experts such
as election o cials. Similar to the present work, Schryen et al. [65] develop a
quantitative trust metric upon qualitative propositional logic. The quantifica-
tion builds on standard probability theory. As opposed to the present work, the
authors do neither model the severity of threats to the system’s security nor
do they include uncertainty measures into their specification. Consequently,
referring to the present work, their trust metric falls short in terms of expres-
siveness.
Küsters et al. [42, 43] provide a formal framework for measuring the level
of verifiability, privacy, coercion-resistance, and accountability of voting pro-
tocols. The framework measures (by means of a so called  ) the adversary’s
chance of achieving her goal, e.g. making a verifier accept an incorrect election
result (verifiability) or distinguishing between the fact whether an observed
voter casts a vote for one candidate or another candidate (privacy). The mea-
surement depends on a number of factors, such as the set of honest authorities,
the number of honest voters, the number of voting options, and probability
distributions for these voting options. In other words, the framework precisely
measures to what extent specific adversarial capabilities (given in terms of
dishonest authorities and voters) su ce to cause specific impact on a specific
requirement. In spite of its contribution, the framework does not provide an
interface to election o cials and does not incorporate election settings (e.g.
by means of probabilistic adversaries). Hence, the framework does not directly
support election o cials in evaluating a scheme’s adequacy within concrete
election settings. To that end, both works turn out to have complementary
goals. Despite this di↵erence, both works address quantitative security from
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di↵erent directions and can therefore benefit from each other. We consequently
foresee an integration of both approaches as future work.
10 Conclusion and Future Work
This work has addressed the research challenge of quantifying the security
of Internet voting schemes within specific election settings. Therefore, the
quantitative security evaluation framework SecIVo has been developed. Se-
cIVo provides a set of security requirements and adversarial capabilities. By
its conceptual nature, SecIVo builds the interface between system analysts
and election o cials. On the one side, system analysts deduce qualitative se-
curity models of Internet voting schemes on the basis of security requirements
and adversarial capabilities. On the other side, election o cials specify their
election settings by means of the number of eligible voters and the number
of expected voters, as well as probabilistic adversary models. On the foun-
dation of qualitative security models and a specified election setting, SecIVo
determines the satisfaction degrees of the scheme under investigation by the
application of risk theory and Monte-Carlo simulations. As such, SecIVo forms
the foundation for election o cials to build their decision about the selection
of an Internet voting scheme upon.
The applicability of SecIVo has been substantiated by a proof of concept
application. Therefore, on the basis of a literature review, qualitative security
models of Helios and Remotegrity have been determined and evaluated within
three election settings. The findings indicate that neither scheme conceptually
dominates the other, but rather the adequacy of both schemes depends on
the election setting under consideration. While Remotegrity plays its strength
when it comes to compromised voting devices, Helios might be the more ap-
propriate choice whenever adversaries provoke direct interaction with voters.
For the future, we see several research directions: SecIVo builds upon a
set of widely established security requirements. Yet, there are specific security
requirements, which are beyond the current scope. For instance, there might
be cases in which the fact whether a voter participated in the election or not
might be private (aka. anonymity). In fact, considering requirements beyond
security, such as usability and understandability, requires the consolidation of
di↵erent metrics and scales. We intend to address these challenges in future
work. Furthermore, we plan to encourage system analysts to deduce qualitative
security models for a range of Internet voting schemes such as JCJ / Civitas
[19,37], Pretty Good Democracy [63], Pretty Understandable Democracy [12].
Additionally, we intend to investigate whether the quantification approach by
Küsters et al. can be combined with our construction to obtain the best of
both approaches.
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